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ABSTRACT 
 
As in many countries, autonomisation of organisations in the public 
sector has been common practice in the Netherlands in the last decades. 
A wide variety of organisational structures has been used which makes 
it hard to understand how autonomised organisations are controlled. In 
this project, emphasis is on the ex ante controls that are used by 
Parliament to create organisations as well as to appropriate resources to 
them. Attribution of responsibility and production characteristics 
including issues on ownership and commissioning are important 
aspects to be considered when organising ex ante controls for 
autonomised organisations. Given these characteristics, a one size fits 
all approach in controlling autonomised organisations is not suitable, 
not even within subgroups of organisations. An empirical study on 
cases from within one subgroup of autonomised organisations shows 
that there is still a strong emphasis on budgetary control only rather 
than on performance control. Little attention is given to specifications 
of services and problems of ownership and commissioning which could 
be used as tools for differentiation in control. 
 
Key words: new public management, autonomisation, budgeting, 
performance management, public services. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In many countries, NPM theories have led to 
changes in the organisational setting in which government 
                                                 
1  The author thanks N. Barkel for his contribution on the section 
on RWTs as well as those who commented on a previous 
version of this text. 
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services are produced and delivered to society. The 
traditional departmental setting is not the standard 
anymore, but is complemented by several forms of 
institutional arrangements at arm’s length of government 
(e.g. Talbot 2004), commonly referred to as ‘quangos’ (e.g. 
Barker 1982). Autonomisation and quangocratisation (Van 
Thiel 2000) are two concepts very close to each other. 
Quangocratisation and autonomisation have a relationship 
to privatisation (Boorsma and Mol 1983, Von Weizsäcker, 
Young, and Finger 2005), but essentially under 
autonomisation government still holds a form of interest – 
politically or financially – in the newly formed 
organisation.  
Autonomisation is a process in which managerial 
responsibility is transferred from bureaucratic hierarchy to 
managers that can be held accountable for the 
responsibilities attributed. In this context, the OECD refers 
to manager’s autonomy as ‘...the ability to make 
decisions…without constant involvement or need for 
approval by the line minister’ (OECD 2002: 13). 
Autonomisation differs from privatisation as privatisation 
has two clear cut forms: either creating a private law entity 
from a former government unit or privatisation is the result 
of a process in which government withdraws all 
responsibility for planning, funding and production and 
leaves it to the market. Autonomisation has two forms as 
well: external autonomisation by creating a new legal entity 
and internal autonomisation which merely creates more 
degrees of freedom for management within an existing 
legal entity (see e.g. Van Thiel 2000: 8; Kummeling and 
Duijkersloot 2003: 80). 
Studies on quangos often focus on creation and 
implementation (e.g. Pollitt and Talbot 2004) or on 
management tools (e.g. Lægreid, Ronness and Rubecksen 
2007) and institutional arrangements (e.g. OECD 2002). 
Studies on the relation to the budget authorisation and 
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appropriation dimension do not exist. The Netherlands 
Court of Audit [NCA] noted in its most recent report on a 
particular form of Dutch externally autonomised 
organisations, that information provision on accountability 
of operations towards Parliament of these organisations 
needs more attention (Parliament 2006a: 9). Accountability 
can only be realised when it is possible to compare to a 
certain standard. The budget authorisation process sets 
these standards. So, before accountability can be realised, it 
is worthwhile to study the authorised arrangements set by 
politicians in relation to externally autonomised entities. 
In this paper I will address the following research 
question: What are the ex ante control tools available to 
Parliament to find a match between the level of 
autonomisation and political control with respect to 
external autonomisation of provision of services in the 
public domain? 
The paper starts with a brief summary on theory 
with respect to autonomisation (section II). Section III 
provides a description of institutional arrangements that are 
used in the Dutch setting for providing government 
services. Legislation and other instruments can be used to 
set a framework under which the services can be provided 
by autonomised entities. These instruments will be 
discussed in section IV. In section V, I will address 
empirical findings on actual control used by government in 
their relation to the autonomised entities. Finally, section 
VI provides some conclusions. 
 
AUTONOMISATION AS PART OF PUBLIC 
MANAGEMENT REFORM 
 
Traditional government consists of a (federal) State, 
an intermediate government level (provinces in the 
Netherlands) and a number of local government entities. As 
of the 1980-ies, in several countries under budgetary 
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constraints, there has been an urge to improve efficiency 
and effectiveness of government (e.g. Osborne and Gaebler 
1992; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). Part of the problem of 
inefficiency of the public sector is according to public 
choice theory caused by the monopolistic characteristics of 
many of the services provided in the public sector (Boyne, 
Farrell, Law, Powell and Walker 2003: 8). A solution to 
this problem could be the introduction of a more 
competitive setting. Niskanen (1968: 305) suggested that 
activities performed by a bureaucracy could be taken over 
by private – profit seeking – entities. As a result, both 
politicians and bureaucrats would be restricted in their 
efforts to follow their own interests (Walsh 1995: 19). This 
basically economic argument is contested in literature. The 
problem of public service provision and the effects of 
government intervention do not change as a result of 
rearranging an organisational structure (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2004: 161; Homburg, Pollitt and Van Thiel 
2007: 7). Furthermore, organisational change may lead to 
fragmented government with negative impact for 
transparency and accountability (Pollitt, Talbot, Caulfield 
and Smullen 2004: 4). 
The emphasis on accountability with respect to 
restructuring of government services can be discussed as 
well: accountability can only be realised when it is clear 
beforehand what responsibilities exist at what level and 
what goals must be realised. Thus the attribution of 
responsibilities is a key element in the autonomisation 
debate. This also implies that the dichotomy government 
provision versus commercial private provision of services 
is not as strict as has been suggested by Niskanen. In 1983, 
Boorsma and Mol identified five market concepts with 
respect to provision of services (Boorsma and Mol 1983: 
25-26; Bokkes 1989: 10). Table 1 summarises these five 
concepts. 
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Table 1 
Forms of government provision of services 
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produces X - - -
Source: author’s compilation. 
 
The options mentioned in table 1 on external 
autonomisation (hiving off) government activities are not 
the only developments in organising public service 
provision. In ‘t Veld (1995: 10) indicates that in some cases 
activities that were formerly privately organised are 
transformed to government controlled entities. This process 
is labelled hiving in (Van Thiel 2000: 10) in Dutch 
‘verstatelijking’. I note that hiving in and hiving off are 
opposites similar to nationalisation and privatisation. 
Nationalisation is unusual in a Dutch context (De Vries and 
Yesilkagit 1999: 118-119) and would not provide an 
accurate description of the position of an entity that is hived 
in. 
The economic-organisational dimension of service 
provision in the public domain is one issue but not the 
whole story. Services delivered towards or on behalf of 
government can have a variety of characteristics. Some 
services are directly aimed at citizens, for example in the 
health sector. Others are provided because they are in the 
general interest, for example financial markets oversight. 
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These differences have an effect on the possibilities for 
funding of the services provided and on the level of 
demand for that service. In the control relation between 
government and the entity providing the service, in some 
cases this results in problems between the ownership role 
with respect to service provision and the commissioning 
role. From an ownership perspective, government is 
concerned about continuity of the organisation; from a 
commissioning perspective, the main issue is receiving the 
required services at an appropriate price (Van Oosteroom 
2002: 116; Linker 2006: 101). The difference between the 
ownership perspective and the commissioning perspective 
may lead to conflicts of interest within the government 
‘controlling’ the organisation or between the government 
and the ‘controlled’ entity.  
Whether a process of ‘hiving off’ or of ‘hiving in’ is 
realised, in most Dutch cases a separate legal entity is 
producing the required services. The main exception to this 
rule is the form in which government provision is realised 
by means of internal autonomisation (creation of executive 
agencies). The Quango concept ranges from executive 
agencies to charities that may only have a financial relation 
to government (Van Thiel 2000: 8). To avoid 
misinterpretation of concepts, I will use the concept of 
‘associated entities’. An associated entity is a separate legal 
entity with an appointed board and a governance structure 
that is influenced by government and has a long term 
business-like relationship with government to deliver 
services on behalf of government intended to have effect on 
society. This definition excludes contract relations that only 
regard service delivery towards government such as is the 
case with lease of offices, catering or entities providing 
services in the public domain where government has no 
influence at all such as the Red Cross. 
Before I can apply the theoretical notions on 
autonomisation and service provision with respect to Dutch 
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associated entities, I will first provide a general description 
of the different types of entities that exist at the Dutch 
national level.  
 
THE DUTCH STATE AND ITS ASSOICATED 
ENTITIES 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
The Netherlands is a decentralised unitary State in 
which three main levels of government exist: the national 
government, provincial governments and local 
governments. Policies of national interest are controlled by 
the national government. Local and provincial governments 
can develop their own policies within the legal frameworks 
set by the constitution. In a number of policy sectors, 
national government sets a policy framework which is 
executed on the local level with (partial) funding of 
national government in co-government programs. In this 
paper I only focus on associated entities at the national 
level. 
At the national level, associated entities can be 
created by government based on public law or private law. 
From a governance perspective, responsibility of the 
minister with respect to associated entities is restricted. The 
Dutch system is based on individual ministers’ 
responsibility rather than full government responsibility for 
autonomised entities (see Christensen, Lægreid and Wise 
2002: 161). A minister is fully responsible for all acts of the 
department he is managing, but his responsibility for an 
associated entity is restricted to three issues: first, a 
minister is responsible as far as authority is attributed to 
him/her. Second a minister is responsible and thus 
accountable for the framework in which the associated 
entity is operating in and third, a minister is responsible for 
his/her acts with respect to the associated entity – either 
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public or private - (Kummeling et al. 1999: 19-20). In the 
relation between minister and associated entity, the first 
two issues are most relevant because they determine the 
structural relations whereas the last issue only oversees 
individual actions.  
Associated entities basically emerge either by 
creating an entity that formerly has been part of 
government activities. Alternatively a private entity is 
hived in to the public domain because the services 
delivered are regarded as part of the public domain. In the 
Dutch context, historically a number of services which are 
now regarded as services in the public domain were 
developed on the basis of private initiatives.  
 
ASSOCIATED ENTITIES AT NATIONAL LEVEL 
 
In the Netherlands, four main groups of associated 
entities can be identified. The political relevance of these 
groups in the decision making process varies both between 
groups as well as within the groups. The first group are 
'Zelfstandige Bestuursorganen' [ZBO]; similar to British 
Non Departmental Public Bodies (Van Thiel 2000: 6). A 
ZBO has been assigned an authoritative unilateral decision 
making task but generally operates outside the hierarchical 
structure of a department, except for some very small ZBOs 
which are included within the departmental structure for 
practical reasons. All ZBOs are materially independent 
from government. Examples of ZBOs are the land registry 
office ‘Kadaster’, market authorities such as those for the 
financial markets (AFM; see appendix for full names) and 
competition (NMa) and income providing entities such as 
SVB, which provides the national pension benefits. 
Depending on how they are counted, the number ranges 
from some 140 (Parliament 2008a) to some 540 
(Parliament 1995: 10). Financial operational relevance adds 
up to some € 8 bln. (Source: own calculations based on 
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annual reports 2006 and budget documents); a number of 
them provide income transfers adding up to some € 35 bln. 
The second group is labelled 'Rechtspersonen met 
wettelijke taak' [RWT] (Legal entity with statutory task, see 
e.g. Kummeling and Duijkersloot 2003). RWTs partly 
overlap ZBOs; in this paper reference is only made to 
RWTs that do not qualify as ZBO. Such an RWT has no 
authoritative power; but services that are provided are 
publicly funded. The RWT-group includes institutions of 
primary and secondary education (some 1,600 entities) and 
next to them some 150 other institutions such as regional 
police forces, private – not for profit - detention centres, 
national musea and health insurance services. ZBOs and 
RWTs are the two groups that qualify under the Dutch 
Budgeting and accounting act ‘Comptabiliteitswet’ 
(CW2001:91d) as publicly funded entities. ZBOs and 
RWTs are listed in an annex to the departmental budget 
documents. The two other groups discussed below do not 
qualify as publicly funded and are not separately listed in 
budget documents. Despite of that they can still be regarded 
as associated entities. State participations (and formerly 
state companies) are entities in which the Dutch state holds 
shares. For some reason that particular company is 
regarded as being of national interest and is thus at least 
partially government controlled. An example is Schiphol 
Airport. Again, in a few cases (e.g. Central Bank) the State 
participation has a ZBO/RWT status as well. The last group 
is labelled 'others'. Prominent groups of organisations in 
this category are hospitals and care institutions as well as 
social housing associations. Although these types of entities 
operate at local or regional level, they provide services 
within a national legal framework and are only indirectly or 
not at all funded by taxes or fees.  
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Figure 1: Overview of Dutch national governments and its 
associated entities 
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CREATING ASSOCIATED LEGAL ENTITIES 
 
The process of creating associated entities will be 
presented from a legal analytical perspective. Christensen 
et al. (2002) indicate that it depends on instrumental-
structural, historical-institutional and environmental 
features how transformation towards autonomised entities 
in a particular jurisdiction is realised. In the Netherlands, 
there has been no structural plan for autonomisation. Only 
in the case of executive agencies, a framework for creating 
such units was included in CW before the first executive 
agency was created (Ministerie van Financiën 1991). With 
respect to external autonomisation, Van Thiel (2006: 116) 
noted that no systematic patterns in assigning tasks to 
associated entities exist. Furthermore, the type of 
associated entity may vary over time without changes in 
 
PAQ WINTER 2010 489 
services provided. Both Van Thiel (2006) and Bertelli 
(2006) note that there is a tendency for an approach in 
which less autonomy exists, particularly for public law 
based autonomised entities. This is a reflection of political 
concern on control of associated entities that started with 
debates on ZBOs and by 2008 also covers other types of 
associated entities (Parliament 2008b) The fact that 
structured plans on autonomisation have been missing, may 
be a threat to transparency. An analysis of the tools 
available for ex ante control on associated entities can 
contribute to future transparency when creating new 
entities. 
The legal procedures for creation of an externally 
autonomised entity with a separate legal status by 
government vary with the type of legal entity to be created. 
The Dutch constitution requires that a new public law legal 
entity is created by law, which implies that Parliament has 
to pass a law which defines governance structure, task and 
funding of the newly created entity. The minister also has 
an option to create a private law legal entity under the 
regulations laid down in the ‘Comptabiliteitswet’ [CW]. As 
of 1995, the proposal to create a new private law entity is 
announced and Parliament has the opportunity to object. If 
not, the minister is allowed to create the new private law 
entity. Dalhuisen (2004) noted that in fact there are three 
options for a minister to create a new – private law - legal 
entity. In two cases the regulations of CW apply: when the 
minister is the only one involved in creating a legal entity 
or when the minister creates the entity in cooperation with 
private partners (joint creation). There is a third option, the 
minister supports creating a new legal entity but is not 
involved in the formal procedure of writing up the statutes. 
In that case, formally private parties create the entity and 
the CW requirement of Parliamentary consent is not 
applicable.  
490 PAQ WINTER 2010 
The other solution to arrive at associated entities is 
realised by hiving in an entity the domain of government. 
In that case, an existing private law entity is regarded to be 
influenced by a government level with respect to their 
operations. The most extreme form of hiving in exists in 
the case of passing a law in Parliament which gives the 
legal entity a new status within the public domain. An 
example of this case is the Financial Markets Authority 
(AFM) which originally started as a private entity created 
by the financial industry. The other solutions are that when 
certain criteria are met, the legal entity may be entitled to 
act on behalf of, or is funded by government. This holds for 
example in the education, health/care and social housing 
sectors. Other options to hive in are buying shares in an 
existing entity or through funding and or financing 
agreements.  
The general trend in the past 20 years has been that 
actively taking a stake in companies is not a government 
policy anymore (Parliament 2006c: 33). Table 2 
summarises the options that exist for creating associated 
entities. 
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Table 2:Forms of creating associated entities 
Creating an associated 
entity 
Hiving in an 
associated entity 
Regards 
associated 
entity 
By law, with approval 
of Parliament. 
By law, with 
approval of 
Parliament. 
ZBO 
By decree, based on 
CW with consent of 
Parliament.* 
Not applicable. Executive 
Agency 
By statutes, with 
consent of Parliament. 
• actively 
creating 
• joint creation 
Buying shares. 
By recognising 
entity under criteria 
set in laws/decrees. 
By creating a long 
term funding or 
financing relation. 
ZBO; RWT; 
State partici-
pation. 
By statutes: no ex ante 
consent. 
• support creation 
By recognising 
entity under criteria 
set in laws/decrees. 
By creating a long 
term funding or 
financing relation. 
Others 
* Listed to give a full overview. This holds only for 
executive agencies which are in fact not separate legal entities but 
units with some autonomy within the hierarchical structure of a 
ministry. 
Source: author’s compilation. 
 
MANAGING EX ANTE CONTROL OF 
ASSOCIATED ENTITIES 
 
The lack of market mechanisms in the public sector 
requires that another allocation mechanism is used to 
decide upon the level and quality of services to be 
provided. In the classical setting, services provided by 
government units are based on the allocation decisions 
made by the legislative branch of government. In the 
492 PAQ WINTER 2010 
Netherlands, budget appropriation is the responsibility of 
the minister. The budgeting process is also the prime ex 
ante control tool with respect to associated entities, 
particularly when the associated entity is funded by 
government. In the Netherlands, insufficient authorised 
resources are not an argument to neglect contractual 
financial agreements. In case overspending is forecasted or 
realised, this can be legitimised ex post by Parliament. 
(Janse de Jonge 1993: 369). It depends on the political 
impact of overspending, confidence in the minister and the 
ministerial responsibility in the particular case whether or 
not a minister will have to leave office. 
In a number of cases, budgets cannot be 
appropriated by the minister because funding is based on 
compulsory fees or other user charges. In that case the 
budgeting process is not a suitable instrument for ex ante 
control on associated entities. The type of ex ante control 
mechanisms that exist next to the budgeting control tools 
can be classified in two main groups, one for entities 
created by the legislator or the minister and one for entities 
that were hived in after they were created. In both cases, a 
differentiation can be made between ex ante controls during 
the process of creating/hiving in an entity and ex ante 
controls during regular operations. I will start discussing 
the ex ante tools available to the minister in case of 
creating/hiving in an entity and then focus on ex ante 
controls during regular operations. 
 
EX ANTE CONTROLS IN THE START UP PHASE 
 
Before an associated entity will be created or 
recognised, government must has created a legal 
framework in which the particular service to be delivered 
by the associated entity is described. The legislator can 
attribute authority to the minister in case a public law based 
entity is created. After a political debate that lasted some 10 
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years, a framework law has passed Parliament in which the 
requirements in the governance structure and the 
distribution of responsibilities between minister and board 
of a ZBO – the most commonly created public law entity – 
are described (Parliament 1995; Parliament 2008a). I will 
discuss some details of these elements later on, as they can 
in theory be applied to all entities to be created. 
Furthermore, a transition program will be prepared for 
existing ZBOs (Parliament 2008a). In case of creating a 
new private law entity, the role of Parliament is restricted. 
In principle, CW2001:34 allows a minister to create a 
private law based legal entity unless Parliament explicitly 
requires that a law is passed in which the minister is 
authorised to create the new entity or to participate for 
more than 5% in shares or bonds of an existing entity. This 
solution assures that democratic control exists when a 
minister wishes to use a private law solution to deliver 
public services. In particular, when a minister is creating a 
foundation, a framework exists that describes the possible 
authority to be attributed to the minister. If it is preferred 
that a minister holds a major part of the authority to be 
distributed, creating a foundation is not the proper solution 
for a particular activity (Parliament 2006b: 6).  
Up till now, only the general ex ante controls 
regarding the creation of an associated entity are discussed. 
Kummeling et al. (1999: 39) have classified the authority 
that may be attributed to a minister in case of creating an 
associated entity into four groups: normative authority, 
issues regarding information provision, issues regarding 
governance structure and cyclical authority. In the 
legislative process of creating a public law associated 
entity, Parliament can by means of passing an amendment 
to a proposed law change the actual authority attributed to a 
minister. In all other cases, influence of Parliament is less 
strong: at most Parliament can ask the minister to include 
or exclude particular elements of authority.  
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I will now discuss the three relevant groups of 
authority; the information provision issue is neglected 
because it covers issues as accountability and general 
information provision by the entity, which are mainly ex 
post control tools aimed at all stakeholders. In the other 
three groups, a mixture of ex ante and ex post controls 
exists. First, normative authority covers issues such as 
general instructions and policy rules which are typical ex 
ante controls. From an accountability perspective, these 
rules have two functions. First, they set the standards under 
which the associated entity operates. If a minister has the 
authority to determine or approve such rules, the principle 
of ministerial responsibility implies that Parliament can 
hold the minister accountable for that decision. Second, 
normative controls set the rules under which the entity 
operates and has to comply with. In hindsight, it is possible 
to assess to what extent compliance has been realised. If 
insufficient, the minister has to account for his/her acts 
towards management to assure compliance. Both forms 
cover democratic control on operations of autonomised 
entities. Normative authority is related to decision making 
processes to assure equal treatment in equal cases. 
Associated entities that require regulations of this type are 
likely to be classified as ZBO rather than an ‘ordinary’ 
associated entity. In the case of ZBOs, the normative 
arrangements are presently included in the framework law 
on ZBOs [kZBO] and thus part of a standard format.  
Second, the ex ante governance controls are found 
in arrangements on appointment of members in 
(supervising) boards and ex ante controls on certain 
decisions. Basically, similar governance tools exist in any 
type of associated entity. Examples of ex ante controls on 
decisions can be approval of changes in charters, approval 
of certain type of investment decisions (kZBO: 32). These 
governance tools are meant to assure that the minister is 
able to realise his/her responsibility towards Parliament on 
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monitoring the board. If many ex ante controls are applied, 
relative autonomy of an associated entity is low. The 
governance controls in ZBO cases cover more issues than 
in the case of the ‘other associated entities’. Furthermore, it 
prevents that boards can decide upon restructuring the 
autonomised entity without prior consent, resulting in an 
entity without any control by government at all. The last 
group of ex ante controls regards cyclical responsibilities 
such as the approval or decision on budgets by the minister. 
I will discuss these controls in the next section as they are 
related to ex ante controls during operations.  
When an entity is hived in to the domain of 
government, the ex ante start up decision is either found in 
recognition criteria, buying conditions or in a full 
legislative procedure. In all cases of hiving in, the 
underlying criteria may be similar to the criteria used when 
an entity is created by government: for example cyclical 
criteria such as approval of fees or a prescribed governance 
structure to be laid down in a (revised) charter may be 
required. Instead of approval of fees, price controls by 
setting maximum price increases can be used as well. In 
case a law is used to hive in the entity, the procedure is 
similar to that of creating an entity and can include all types 
of authority.  
By now, the ex ante controls that may be used while 
creating an associated entity have been discussed. The key 
is that the distribution of authority between minister on the 
one hand and the board of the associated entity is laid down 
in the law or charter in which the associated entity is 
created. Particularly in the case of hiving in an entity, the 
instruments of price controls and qualification requirements 
laid down in a program law may be used as well. 
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EX ANTE CONTROLS DURING OPERATIONS 
 
Once an associated entity is created, operational 
control is executed in line with the responsibilities 
attributed to minister and management. At this stage the 
cyclical controls as identified by Kummeling et al. (1999: 
39) have a prominent role. The most prominent of the ex 
ante controls during operations is financial ex ante control. 
There are two basically different forms of financial ex ante 
controls to be identified. First, the annual budgeting 
procedure is to be mentioned. Second, contract based or 
rule driven funding is the other option. In principle, at least 
for traditional budgetary controls, accountability is aimed at 
the political system and is not essentially different from the 
accountability for the hierarchical structures within 
government. This is different when contract or rule driven 
funding exists as these forms allow for assessment of 
efficiency and performance. Cyclical controls do not only 
have a function in the political domain, but also serve an 
accountability role to all other stakeholders. 
The ex ante control realised by budgeting methods 
has two alternative options. First, there is an immediate 
authorisation of the budget of the associated entity by the 
legislative body. Although not externally binding, the 
minister is likely to appropriate the resources allocated to 
the relevant associated entity. Whether the resources are 
allocated on a classic input budget basis or on a more 
sophisticated performance related agreement (Von 
Weiszäcker et al. 2005: 7-8) is a matter of political 
preferences and possibilities for specification of services. 
Of course, ex post accountability can benefit from 
performance based budgets, rather than from traditional 
input budgets. When a budget is to be authorised by 
Parliament, implicitly there has been an approval by the 
minister in charge to include the budgeted level into the 
proposed budget of his department. One might claim that 
 
PAQ WINTER 2010 497 
this is a form of a pre – ex ante control in relation to the 
authorisation provided by Parliament. However, the level 
of detail in budgetary documents of the Dutch State has 
diminished strongly over the last decades (de Kruijf 2005: 
7) under the influence of changing accounting rules. This 
means that in many cases, budgets of associated entities can 
only be found in a budget that covers more than the 
activities of the associated entity only. In that case, the 
main ex ante control is not in the formal budget 
authorisation, but in the budget appropriation by the 
minister who decides to distribute resources to the 
associated entity. The basis for that decision is the approval 
of the budget as submitted by the associated entity to the 
relevant government. The approval of a budget of an 
associated entity is a strong instrument even when budgets 
are not funded by the minister. When a budget of an 
associated entity has to be approved, this has an impact on 
the level of fees that can be charged as well, assuming that 
not approving a budget means that the fees that can be 
derived from that budget are also not accepted. 
In a setting in which public services can be provided 
from a more market based setting, it is possible to use a 
form of a contract in which services are specified rather 
than a mere approval of a budget. Von Weizäcker et al. 
(2005: 7-8) specify a number of contractual forms related 
to different types of associated entities. This ranges from 
service contracts with private entities to concessions and 
diverse intermediate forms of public-private co-operation. 
Depending on the type of contract, ex ante control is on a 
unique individual basis as is for example the case in a 
public-private partnership program aiming at e.g. toll roads. 
Other types of contracts may have a more cyclical 
character, for example when tendering procedures for 
concessions or service delivery are used. The ex ante 
controls are then limited to the program specifications on 
the case basis and the market mechanism decides which 
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provider has the winning bid. Although such contracts are 
close to market relationships, there still is a residual risk 
involved that can be regarded as a typical risk in case of 
associated entities. The remaining residual risk refers to the 
case that the entity that won the tendering procedure fails to 
provide the service. Government then has to fall back to 
other solutions – at a certain price – to assure that service-
levels towards citizens remain assured. That this is not a 
theoretical proposition can be illustrated by the case of a 
nationwide care provider that went bankrupt and where 
local and national government had to find solutions to 
guarantee that services were delivered (Parliament 2008c: 
2). 
Theory can provide a general remark on ex ante 
controls in these forms of contract based public private 
partnerships, but an assessment of the actual impact of ex 
ante controls in these cases can only be based on case 
studies of individual contracts. Therefore I will neglect the 
ex ante controls on contracts in the remainder of this paper. 
In this section, I have discussed the ex ante controls 
available to legislative body and/or minister. The most 
important issue is the distribution of authority at the start-
up of an associated entity. After creation of an entity the 
cyclical authority attributed to Parliament (budget 
authorisation) and/or minister are the prominent ex ante 
tools. In table 3, I have summarised these tools. In the next 
section, I will focus on empirical results with respect to the 
use of the ex ante tools.  
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Table 3: 
Ex ante controls available with respect to associated 
entities 
Entity created Entity hived in 
Budgetary funding. 
Contracting. 
Performance standards. 
Budgetary funding. 
Contracting. 
Program legislation  
• Defining tasks 
Program legislation: 
• Recognition 
requirements 
• Price controls 
Ministerial responsibility 
laid down in charters 
• Normative tools 
• Cyclical tools 
• Governance tools 
Changes in charters enforced. 
Source: author’s compilation. 
 
PRACTICES IN EX ANTE CONTROL OF 
ASSOCIATED ENTITIES 
 
National government has the opportunity to create 
arrangements in which ex ante control tools in their relation 
to associated entities can be institutionalised. The fact that 
tools can be available does not necessarily imply that these 
tools are used in the actual relation between government 
and associated entity. In this section I will focus on the use 
of the control tools that are available. Due to the wide range 
of arrangements, it is not possible to pay attention in full 
detail to all possible associated entities. I have chosen to 
focus on the group of ZBOs and will discuss the other 
groups of associated entities only briefly.  
The research methodology used for ZBOs is based 
on finding indicators that provide clues to the specification 
of production to be delivered by the entities on behalf of 
government. I used data based on original research with 
respect to ex ante control of ZBOs. The data are derived 
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from 11 case studies on particular groups of ZBOs (De 
Kruijf and Mol 2007) in which relevant documents on ex 
ante control were studied next to interviews with 
representatives of the ZBO and the ‘controlling’ ministry. 
Appendix 1 lists the ZBOs that were included in this study. 
The case studies of ZBOs allowed for a detailed 
evaluation of the authority provided to the minister. 
Therefore, it is possible to assess whether or not a minister 
decides on a budget proposal or merely approves it, 
whether or not documents exist in which the desired level 
of services are mentioned, approval of investments and the 
allocation of the operational surplus at the end of a fiscal 
year.  
As stated, I have studied 11 ZBOs. These ZBOs 
were selected based on specific characteristics in activities 
– either providing income transfers or acting as a 
monitoring institution. Five of these ZBOs originate from 
private activities and were thus hived in to the public 
domain. There is no clear pattern that suggests that hived in 
ZBOs are treated differently from those that were hived off. 
To put it stronger, some of the entities that originate from 
the private sector are now under very strict ex ante control 
by the minister. In table 4, I have summarised the findings 
on the ex ante control tools that were used by ministers 
with respect to the selected ZBOs.  
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Table 4: Cyclical ex ante controls used by minister with 
respect to selected ZBOs (N=11) 
Type of control tool D
et
er
m
in
e 
A
pp
ro
va
l/ 
co
ns
en
t 
N
o 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
t 
Explicit performance indicators 4 0 7 
Budget proposal 5 5 1 
Investment proposals 4 1 6 
Reallocation of surplus 8 0 3 
Source: author’s compilation. 
 
The general impression that can be derived from 
table 4 is that there is an emphasis on ex ante budgetary 
control. This is in line with Bertelli’s (2006) observations 
on public law ZBOs. In only a minority of cases a relation 
has been made to the actual services to be provided, which 
can be concluded from the lack of performance based 
arrangements. In all other cases, there is an implicit 
assumption that the law which describes the activities of 
the respective ZBOs is sufficient to control the individual 
entity. Schillemans and Van Thiel’s (2009) study on 
reputation of ZBOs indicates that in general, attention 
given by stakeholders - including Parliament – focuses on 
superficial and affairs rather than on what is actually 
happening within the organisation. Such an attitude might 
also be part of an explanation for a lack of performance 
based controls on ZBOs. 
A remarkable issue from a control perspective is 
that in many cases there is no explicit investment 
arrangement. Budgetary control may be jeopardised when 
management has the freedom to choose the investment 
level. The problem can be mitigated because in operations 
financing of investments is in many cases only possible 
through the ministry of Finance, which can decide not to 
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provide the requested resources. Second, on the level below 
the formal decision making indicators described here, a 
difference in political attention with respect to the ZBOs 
studied is found. In some cases politicians are actively 
involved in the control process, in others the whole process 
is left to the civil servants and ministerial consent is only a 
formality. On the one hand this can be explained by 
political relevance, on the other differences in attitude 
towards ZBOs within different departments and reserves to 
intervene – particularly with respect to impartial 
monitoring institutions – are other explanations for 
differences in controlling ZBOs. 
Third, possible role conflicts of owner and 
commissioner of the services provided can be observed. 
One of the issues with respect to ownership is whether or 
not boards of ZBOs should be supported by a Supervising 
Board operating on behalf of the owner. Particularly in 
those cases where the ZBO originates from government 
there is reluctance to use such a governance structure. It is 
claimed that a Supervising Board would result in less 
control by ministers. Van Thiel, Canté and Van Meerkerk, 
(2009, p13) note that Supervising boards may not be the 
solution due to the political background of many members 
of Supervising Boards or the inclusion of interest groups in 
the Boards. As a result, they focus on other issues than the 
continuity of the organisation they are supposed to 
supervise. Furthermore, the ownership role is under 
pressure due to discussions whether or not a certain level of 
equity should be available to management of the ZBO. This 
is contrary to kZBO, in which an explicit requirement is 
made allowing equity for ZBOs to cover fluctuations in 
operational results. 
Fourth, the distinction between different forms of 
service provision as identified by Boorsma and Mol (1983) 
does not seem to be helpful to address control approaches 
for groups of associated entities. Based on the knowledge 
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on the services provided, the organisational structure and 
the sources of funding of individual cases, table 5 shows 
that both ZBOs and RWTs are split up over most 
categories. This result does not imply that the classification 
of service provision should be rejected, it only indicates 
that it is not useful in an attempt to generalise the activities 
of groups of associated entities. 
 
Table 5: Classification of service provision applied to 
associated entities. 
 ZBO RWT Others 
Consolidated 
provision 
NMa   
Contract 
provision 
RvR, 
UWV, 
SVB, 
CVZ 
Police,  
Detention 
centres,  
Care provision 
 
Grant 
provision 
NZA, 
Pf/Vf, 
fBKVB 
Education;  
health 
insurance; 
health provision 
 
Regulated 
provision 
NAK, 
AFM, 
CFV 
  
Private 
provison 
  State 
Participation; 
Public 
utilities. 
Source: author’s compilation. 
 
Finally, some remarks are made with respect to ex 
ante control of the associated entities that were not 
explicitly studied as well. Police forces and private 
detention centres – both RWTs - are publicly funded and 
thus subject to the ex ante allocation mechanism. In the 
appropriation process, the minister uses explicit 
performance and or cost price based arrangements. In the 
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case of the police forces even a bonus system exists that 
allows for additional resources to be used for program 
activities when targets are met. With respect to the police 
force, normative and governance controls also exist, 
whereas in the detention centres normative controls 
(treatment and the like) exist. In the health insurance 
branch, ex ante influence is determined by the requirements 
on the insurance program (normative control) to be 
provided. Given that program, the market is open for 
competition and no other ex ante controls are used by 
minister or Parliament. Another group of RWTs – national 
musea – is, as of 2009, budgetary funded on a long term 
subsidy contract and a monitoring program. Next to the ex 
ante budgetary controls, the minister still has the power to 
appoint/dismiss the board of a museum (Parliament 2005) 
as part of the governance controls available.  
State participations cover in most cases market 
activities. The ex ante controls available are attributed to 
the minister as shareholder and thus mainly affect the 
governance structure issues. Parliament is only involved 
when general policy on the State’s strategy towards holding 
State participations is discussed (see Parliament 2006c), or 
in the formal case when a new State participation is realised 
under the CW2001 regulations.  
Under ‘other’ associated entities at the national 
level, entities such as hospitals, care-institutions and social 
housing associations are included. Ex ante control on these 
organisations is only indirect: the law regulates prices 
(health/care) or price increases (housing) for the services to 
be delivered.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper I focused on ex ante controls with 
respect to public services provided by autonomised entities 
in the Netherlands. My research question was: What are the 
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ex ante control tools available to Parliament to find a match 
between the level of autonomisation and political control 
with respect to external autonomisation of provision of 
services in the public domain? 
The main topics derived from theory to address 
control of autonomised government units are the 
distribution of responsibility, characteristics of provision of 
services and the possible role conflicts between ownership 
and commissioning role of government with respect to the 
services delivered. Studying autonomisation suggests that 
government transfers activities to entities outside the 
immediate hierarchical control of government. In some 
cases however, government has gradually claimed stronger 
controls on services that were originally provided by 
private entities. In this paper both ‘hiving off’ and ‘hiving 
in’ were included under the label ‘associated entities’. The 
variety of associated entities does not allow for a ‘one size 
fits all’ approach for ex ante control. The study showed that 
responsibilities attributed to a minister in the ZBO-cases 
selected include in most cases financial controls. In the 
majority of cases, performance controls have not been 
made explicit. With respect to other associated entities, in 
some cases normative (regulations) and or governance 
(appointments and the like) controls exist, but these are not 
applied in all cases along similar lines. The role conflict 
between owner and commissioner is recognised and in 
some cases explicit separation of roles has been created. 
The effectiveness of this solution as well as of using a 
Supervising Board may be discussed. 
Distribution of responsibility depends on the type of 
associated entity and the services provided. In some cases, 
it appears that a mismatch between formal and actual 
distribution of responsibilities exist. In the cases studied, an 
emphasis on (traditional) budgetary control in the ZBO 
cases was found. This might be in conflict with the 
intended autonomy of ZBOs. The overall conclusion of this 
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paper is that although a framework for ex ante control of 
associated entities exists, at least three problems are not 
solved yet. This regards first the specification of services 
requested. Second, the role conflict between commissioner 
and owner, which is particularly an issue when the minister 
has both roles under his responsibility remains problematic. 
Finally the ex ante control on associated entities that 
operate locally or regionally under a national framework 
can be problematic due to the restricted – framework – 
responsibility a minister has, which does not fully cover 
possible risks at the level of individual associated entities. 
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APPENDIX 1: ZBOS INCLUDED IN THIS STUDY. 
 
ZBO Hived in? 
Uitvoering Werknemersverzekeringen (UVW) Yes 
Sociale Verzekeringsbank (SVB) Yes 
Raden voor Rechtsbijstand (RvR) No 
Autoriteit Financiële Markten (AFM) Yes 
Centraal Fonds Volkshuisvesting CFV) No 
Fonds Beeldende Kunsten, Vormgeving en 
Bouwkunst (fBKVB) 
No 
Participatiefonds/Vervangingsfonds (Pf/Vf) Yes 
Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit (NZA) No 
Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (NMa) No 
Nederlandse Algemene Keuringsdienst voor 
Zaaizaad en Pootgoed (NAK) 
Yes 
College voor Zorgverzekeringen (CVZ) No 
 
 
